Good afternoon.
Today, the European Commission adopted the annual report on Enlargement, a scorecard of 10 accession countries.
Since last year’s edition, Europe’s security outlook has deteriorated sharply.
War, strategic competition, and economic uncertainty have increased. There is little hope for an immediate end to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Gray zone attacks and sabotage against Europe are on the rise.
There is strength in numbers. A larger Union means also strengthening Europe’s security, growing our geopolitical weight on the geopolitical arena, and also our ability to project influence. It means a larger market and new opportunities for our economies.
Today’s report carries a clear message: reforms bring results. Membership is moving closer for countries that deliver. For the first time, we introduce roadmaps for accession negotiations with Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine.
These four countries are the frontrunners for membership. Commissioner Kos will take you through the country assessments in detail. But let me just make the most important points for European security: Montenegro is the closest to finish line, with a clear path in signing accession treaty by next summer. Albania has opened all negotiation clusters in just over a year. The task now is to sustain the pace by accelerating reforms. Moldova continues to advance despite unprecedented external pressure. Its commitment to reform and alignment with the European Union legislation has remained consistent. Ukraine is carrying sweeping reforms under Russian bombs, no candidate country has ever undertaken reforms of this scale while being at war, and this deserves recognition. Based on Ukraine’s progress, we should move to open all negotiation clusters before the end of the year. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia, the outlook is uneven.
Türkiye remains a candidate country and a key partner, but the conditions that brought its accession to standstill remain.
Georgia has been on a collision course with the EU over democratic backsliding and fundamental rights, Georgia’s accession remains de facto halted. Merit and reforms will continue to determine the pace of accession, as does adherence to the rule of law and fundamental rights.
I want to stress that the commitments made on the road to membership do not expire after accession.
This year’s report brings the security dimension of the enlargement into sharper focus. For the first time, it includes a dedicated section for Security and Defence.
Over the past year, most candidate countries have increased and maintained high levels of alignment with the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, and this is an important expression of their strategic orientation and adherence to EU values. Many candidate countries already contribute to Europe’s security. Ukraine is Europe’s first line of defence against Russia. Kyiv’s battlefield experience is second to none, and it is critical for Europe’s security and defence readiness.
Moldova and our Western Balkans partners contribute to EU missions and operations. They help to protect our borders and counter foreign information manipulation. These contributions also strengthen our security. Already today, a larger Union can build on them tomorrow. For decades, enlargement has been the EU’s most successful foreign policy.
Every round of enlargement has strengthened our continent. Today’s geopolitical reality makes the next round even more urgent.
Where countries that progress are left waiting, instability takes root. Enlargement is direct investment in Europe’s security.
Q&A
Q. I have a question both for the High Representative and for Commissioner Kos. What do you see as a realistic timeline for Ukraine to join the EU, and do you see willingness in the Member States to actually bring Ukraine into the bloc over the next few years?
There are a lot of steps still to be done. But what is important [is] that we also need to work with our public, because when we talk about security, there is so much that Ukraine can actually bring on board when Ukraine is part of Europe. In terms of our security, the know-how that they have from the battlefield, the capabilities that they have developed. The expertise there is definitely for our security. It is good that we move as fast as possible with Ukraine.
Q. On the meeting that takes place at the moment, I think in the Berlaymont, on Ukraine negotiations, could you tell us a bit what the idea is of this meeting? I think it will continue tomorrow at NATO. So, what are your expectations?
This meeting is on senior advisers’ level. What is my expectation? My expectation is that these senior advisers actually really keep in mind the paper that we agreed with Foreign Ministers regarding the request that Europe has for Russia. Because, so far, the negotiations has only been about what Ukraine should give away, or what concessions they should make. And that is why we have prepared with Foreign Ministers the maximum demands to balance the negotiation table a bit, because Russia still presents its absolute maximum demands. And on our side there also has to be demands to start the negotiation from an equal basis. So, I hope that this is respected.
Q. You know dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is one of key conditions for both countries to progress towards EU. Since you took office, you never organised a high-level meeting due to well-known political circumstances. Now, with established institutions in Kosovo and possible same situation in Serbia, when do you plan to organise a high-level meeting between both?
First of all, I have had a lot of high-level meetings, both with Kosovo as well as Serbia, and I have also received promises from their leaders, to sit down the three of us. We have had also preparations for that meeting because we have an EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue that is working very hard. Now the problem is a bit the same what Marta Kos was also referring to. Regarding Kosovo for a year, we have not had really a functioning government and the institutions in place that has hindered this three-part meeting. Now in Serbia, we had elections. We need to see that the government is put together. But I can assure you that I am willing to engage and will engage with them like I have done with the authorities so far in order to really proceed with this process. Because it is true, it is necessary for both of them to advance on the enlargement path.
Q. High Representative, you spoke about challenges that Europe is facing. Enlargement is one of the solutions. After the vote in the US, do you see a Europe less alone in facing the challenges posed, for example, by the war in Ukraine?
Yes, of course US voters have made their choice clear. I hope that the new Congress and the new Senate will continue supporting Ukraine and also putting more pressure on Russia, that it will happen. Because then Europe, as well as US, are much stronger together. Also passing these messages clearly to Russia with this pressure that they would stop this war. So yes, let us see what happens now. But elections have results.
Q. On its reports on Georgia, Commission states ‘attempts to ban main opposition parties through a constitutional court case written the foundation of Georgia’s democracy’. European Union representatives have been quite critical about the proceeding. What impact would a possible ban on opposition parties have on Georgia’s European accession process? And the second, the European Commission is quite critical on the situation in Georgia on its report. So, does the Commission still consider Georgia a functioning democracy that is moving toward European standards?
Yes, the process is halted, like we both said in our introductory remarks. We are supporting the Georgian people and their choice, and we will have a deeper discussion with the Foreign Ministers regarding Georgia in January how to best actually support the people and their aspirations for the European membership.
Q. To follow up on Georgia with HR/VP. Since you mentioned before that Georgia is on collision course with Europe, are you considering further measures against Georgia in terms of for instance, extending the visa restrictions that is expiring in March and or any other potential sanctions against Georgian officials?
Yes, the Georgian government right now is on a collision course with the European Union regarding the democratic backsliding. That is very, very clear. The steps that have been taken are not going into the right direction. Now, do we consider any response at the moment? It is early to tell. As I said, we will have the deeper dive in January regarding Georgia. There are different views. For us it is most important, how do we make the response so that we clearly indicate that we are supporting the Georgian people and their aspirations and not turning away from the Georgian people who actually want to see also them being part of European Union, but at the same time giving clear messages to the government that we are not supporting these kind of policies.
Q. As we know, this year’s Enlargement Report covers the period up to September 1st and shows good progress for Moldova in security and defence; but recently Moldova faced a major – without precedent in history -a cyber-attack that reportedly exposed the personal data of around 1 million people from Moldova. And yesterday, here in Brussels, the Prime Minister from Moldova said that, I am quoting as well: “The list of suspects is short, and that a state actor could be involved.” The question is how serious, in this view, you assess this attack, especially if a state is behind it. And perhaps a little bit unfair to ask now, but the report is already out, could this attack change your assessment of Moldova’s progress in security and defence?
Like we both said, Moldova is moving under heavy external pressure, and we have seen this with the foreign information manipulation operations that were conducted before this report, and we see this continuing. We actually have also a lot to learn from Moldova in this regard, and that is why I am saying that these candidate countries are also bringing something to us, that we benefit when it comes to the security. When it comes to the issue of cyber-attacks, then this is part of this grey zone tactics that is going on in Europe wider. We see these cyber-attacks also against European countries, and we really need to stick together to actually counter them. And very often these cyber-attacks are targeting companies. So, we need to also help our private companies to patch their vulnerabilities because eventually everything can be weaponised in this way, which is bringing harm to our people, and that is why I think it does not change our assessment. It is actually making it stronger that we need to work together and help our candidate countries, and at the same time also learn from these processes to help ourselves.
Q. My question is about Georgia again. As I remember, there were two times when the European Commission tried to introduce sanctions against the Georgian Dream, and it was two times when the Council did not have consensus on this question. Do you expect that this topic will be brought up again in the Council? Do you expect that it will be finally consensus? And if no, how can you explain that to Georgian people? While according to European Barometer, 70% of Georgian people support European way for Georgia, and basically you said it yourself today that the main problem is Georgian Dream.
The discussion was about sanctioning the ministers who have used violence against protesters. It is true that at that moment we did not have everybody onboard. Certain Member States were against this. Of course, these discussions are going on, and we will have in January really a deep dive on this: how do we approach, what could have the biggest effect. Again, to have the Georgian people, but at the same time signalling to the government very clearly that this is not the right path. So, at the moment, everything is on the table.
Q. This year’s Enlargement Report records renewed Turkish military overflights of Greek islands, including inhabited ones, and reiterates that the Türkiye-Libya maritime memorandum is null and void. Türkiye’s alignment with EU Foreign Policy also remains at just 4%. Given these findings, how do they affect the European Union’s decision on closer security and defence cooperation with Ankara? And are there, High Representative, specific red lines that could prevent such cooperation from moving forward?
Türkiye remains a candidate country and a key partner. Taking this relationship further requires the agreement of all Member States, and you know very well that there are certain Member States who are opposing to deepening the relationship with Türkiye. So that is the situation where we are.
Q. On alignment with Foreign Policy of EU, how important is really this for you because we see for the first time you include Kosovo in assessing their alignment, and it is fully aligned with the EU positions. But what are the benefits of this? Because the countries that are not aligned, they are moving much more than Kosovo. And what do you expect from a future Serbian government on this? Because this was one of the reasons why some Member States did not want for Serbia to open clusters despite the push from European Commission and recommendations from the Commission to do this.
The Foreign and Security Policy alignment at this geopolitical time is not only a box-ticking exercise, or actually, it is not a box-ticking exercise. It is really a question whether you see the world the same way as we do, in these threats that we are facing. So, we take this alignment very seriously. We are happy that majority of the countries are very much aligned with us, even if it is actually very hard for them on certain decision to align. What comes to the Serbian government, we are expecting them to get the government together and then, of course, we will engage with the Serbian government on how they see this process going forward