Good afternoon, buenas tardes,
Allow me, before going into the subject, due to the very difficult circumstances in Spain; permítanme expresar mi pésame por los fallecidos por la tormenta DANA, en España. Son ya más de 60 [muertos], particularmente en la provincia de Valencia, pero también en Albacete y parte de Andalucía.
Se trata de una tormenta de una intensidad sin precedentes en décadas y con muchas personas desaparecidas, que espero que puedan ser localizadas con vida; también con muchos daños materiales.
Quiero expresar la solidaridad de la Comisión Europea con los afectados por esta tragedia. Y también mi agradecimiento a todos los servicios de emergencia, los bomberos, los policías locales, la protección civil, las Fuerzas Armadas, la Policía Nacional, y la Guardia Civil – que con tanto empeño y profesionalidad están dedicados a salvar vidas.
Este hecho, por supuesto, nos recuerda la urgencia de la lucha contra el cambio climático porque la elevada temperatura del Mediterráneo es una de las causas del aumento de estos fenómenos extremos, que son cada vez más frecuentes y cada vez más extremos.
Europa puede ayudar a través del Mecanismo Europeo de Protección Civil y el Fondo Europeo de Solidaridad frente a las catástrofes naturales, visto la enorme cuantía de los daños materiales y de las pérdidas de vidas humanas.
That being said, permítanme ahora el College read-out.
Today, the College adopted the 2024 Enlargement Package, that I presented together with Commissioner [Oliver] Várhelyi, and we will comment with you right now.
Additionally, the College received from the former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, a report on how to strengthen the European preparedness and readiness for [our] defence – both from a civilian and military point of view.
I see that President von der Leyen has presented this report together with [the former] President Niinistö in the morning. It is a report which makes a comprehensive and useful approach to a question that will be very high [on] the agenda: preparedness and readiness for our security and defence; mapping the vulnerabilities that the European Union and the Member States are facing, providing an extensive list of recommendations that will be studied carefully in order to prepare for a wide range of threats.
And now, let’s go to the topic of this press conference. Together with Commissioner Várhelyi, we are about to present to you the fifth – and final – Enlargement Package of this Commission.
Over the past five years, we faced unprecedented challenges on health, environment and security.
Almost one thousand days ago, Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine, making clear that Russia is posing an existential threat to Europe.
Now, more than ever, the European Union membership becomes a strategic choice.
Alternatives can be easy in the short term: loans with no questions asked, high interest rates, or election fraud – easy short-term can bring a hard long-term.
We are putting forward a detailed assessment of the state of play in countries aspiring to become members of the European Union. The assessment is based on the countries’ individual efforts, it is merit-based – [with] the rule of law at the core of it.
Countries which joined the European Union 20 years ago – I was at that time President of the European Parliament, I remember very well – have demonstrated through their socioeconomic success that overcoming short-term challenges paves the way for long-term benefits.
Over the past five years, accession negotiations have returned to the top of the Commission’s agenda.
Back in 2019, there were 5 candidate countries. Today, there are 9 candidates and 1 potential candidate. It makes 10 [countries], twice more. It shows that the European Union acts as a magnet, attracting people and attracting neighbours, attracting people and attracting states.
Gradual integration has been advancing, citizens of enlargement countries gain tangible benefits already. [They do not have] to wait until the end, and at the end have everything. It is a process; and through the process, benefits are tangible and citizens perceive them on a daily basis.
This includes access to Erasmus+ and other research and cultural programmes. Since 2024, no citizen of the Western Balkans needs a visa to travel to the European Union. We have put forward Growth Plans – Commissioner Várhelyi will go in detail – for the Western Balkans, for Moldova, and the Ukraine Facility which reward reforms with the rule of law at the centre.
Now we are looking also for stronger ties in foreign and security policy, involving our partners on key priorities, standing firmly on defending our values to secure regional stability and protect the global order – because our Union should not only grow bigger, but it [also] has to grow stronger.
You can become bigger and not stronger. Size does not mean automatically being stronger. We want both. We want to incorporate our neighbours and we want to be, all together, stronger.
You simply cannot maintain ties with Russia, or to try to do business as usual and expect that your country will be part of the European Union. It is one thing or the other.
Over the years, we have seen that alignment with our Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the most significant indication of the candidates sharing our values and our geopolitical orientation.
Some of our partners are fully aligned with our Common Foreign and Security Policy. I can mention North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – who is aligning voluntarily.
Ukraine and Moldova significantly improved their alignment.
Let me highlight a few country-specific elements before handing over to Olivér [Várhelyi], who will go much more in detail.
Let me just say some things about the most important relevant questions – country by country – starting by the one which is very high on the news: Georgia.
Georgia has conducted parliamentary elections, which were marked by serious irregularities. These need to be investigated and addressed in a transparent and independent manner.
I am not going to go through these irregularities, mentioning one by one, but they are many – and some of them are grave.
It is important to remark that independent observers have not declared the elections to be free and fair. Nor the contrary. So we are in a zone that requires investigation in order to clarify what has happened, which is the scope of the irregularities and how this has been affecting the results.
It consolidates a trend that we have seen by the Georgian authorities in the recent months, moving the country away from the European Union. Away from its values and principles.
Our report offers a clear path for re-engagement should there be political will from Georgia’s leadership. We are offering a clear path for re-engagement on the way to the European Union.
The repeal of the law on foreign influence, which has a chilling effect on civil society and media organisations, and of the law on the so-called ‘family values’ – because discrimination is not a value in our European Union family – these would be first signs of concrete commitment from the Georgian leadership.
It is very important to follow closely the events that will come [during] the next days about the investigation and clarification of the irregularities that have been remarked by the electoral observation teams.
Ukraine has continued to push forward key reforms despite fighting a brutal war of aggression. Ukrainians are fighting two battles at the same time: one in the battlefield, a real war; and another striving to push the reforms needed to become [a] member of the European Union – and we will support Ukraine on both fronts, across all dimensions and in line with our security commitments signed in June.
I am saying security commitments because membership of the European Union is the ultimate security guarantee that we can offer to Ukraine.
On Kosovo and Serbia, allow me to mention the work we have been doing on the Dialogue. Believe me, a lot of work. We solved the license plate issue with their mutual recognition by Kosovo and Serbia. We succeeded in abolishing entry-exit documents, finally allowing citizens of Serbia and Kosovo to travel freely from one side of the border to the other. These are important achievements that were not easy to get.
We put an end to 20 years of unregulated use of energy in the North of Kosovo. And we also reached the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its Implementation Annex – last year, with the so-called Ohrid Agreement. Unfortunately, implementation is still pending. For both Serbia and Kosovo, the [path towards] enlargement and the progress on the European Union-facilitated Dialogue towards normalisation of relations have to go hand in hand. You cannot do one thing without doing the other. The progress towards the European Union and solution to the Dialogue are mutually [dependent] and interacting. They require an effort, but, in the end, hard work pays off [with] great benefits for the people. I hope that this Ohrid Agreement – that was so difficult to get – will be implemented, marking the path towards normalisation and the European Union membership. I repeat: one thing requires the other.
A word about Türkiye. I worked a lot to reverse the negative spiral in our relationship. At the beginning, things were much more difficult than today.
We have re-engaged in areas of mutual interest. In the end, Türkiye is a candidate country whose geopolitical relevance has increased much more.
In the current circumstances, Türkiye is essential. It is essential because the [current] geopolitical context is the most challenging that [we have seen] in a long time.
European citizens expect the European Union to have the capacity to act, to ensure stability and cooperation in our neighbourhood, in our surrounding areas. If we are not able to do that in our immediate neighbourhood, it is very difficult to believe that we could do that in much further parts of the world.
We are not and we will not be a bystander. Also for us, enlargement remains central to our geopolitical approach. This is a clear position of the [European] Commission, to which I have had the honour to be a member.
With this, I will pass the floor to Commissioner Olivér [Várhelyi] who will for sure give more precise and interesting details.
Link to video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-262882
Q&A
Q. On Georgia, we have seen the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Georgia this week. In your communication today we have seen very tough words about backsliding in Georgia and about concerns regarding the elections. And yet, Mr. Orbán actually praised the election in Georgia. How does this fit with EU policy?
About Georgia, I have to say something which it is obvious: the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s visit in Tbilisi is only in the framework of the bilateral relations between Hungary and Georgia. As you know, the foreign policy of the European Union does not prevent Member States from having their own foreign policy. I see that several times, different Member States have different approaches to the same question. The position of the European Union was clearly expressed by myself – and together with the Commission – through a statement and other statements from the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, on Sunday night. It will be on the agenda of the upcoming informal leaders meeting in Budapest. I think that we have to understand the reality. Maybe Prime Minister Orbán has a different view, but the observers have not declared the elections to be free and fair. Normally, when the observers believe that an election has been free and fair, they say it. They have not said the contrary, but they have not said [that] they are free and fair [either]. There is a long list of irregularities that require analysis, review, and we expect that the Georgian bodies – who are in charge of managing the electoral process – will do that in a transparent manner. We expect the Central Electoral Commission of Georgia and relevant authorities investigate these irregularities which have been reported by the observers. You only have to read the report. At the core of the report, there is a long list of considerations about what was not good – not only on the election day, but [also during] the previous days. The whole process has been marked, the observers say, by a tense environment. [There have been] procedural inconsistencies, particularly on the public sector employees, confiscation of ID cards and intimidations, concerns about the ability for voters to cast their vote freely. Read the report, and then you make your own judgement –mine is certainly different from the Prime Minister of Hungary. But I am not going to pretend that all Member States of the European Union have the same view. Normally, they do not have it.
Q. HR/VP Borrell, the report on Türkiye takes note of the country’s low alignment with the European Union’s foreign policy and security, as well as the non-full implementation of the 2016 statement on migration. Nonetheless, the European Union is planning a new high-level council with Türkiye to focus on these same exact issues. So, I was wondering what are your expectations from this new council? Since Türkiye is not aligned fully with the European Union foreign policy and security and migration.
Well, on Türkiye, that is true. It is clear that there is a very low level of alignment with our foreign policy. Not only is it very low, but it is decreasing. While it is not the only country that has a low level of alignment, this is particularly low and decreasing. It is also true that there are areas in which no progress has been made, in particular on the protection of fundamental rights and others. It is also true that the report recognises Türkiye’s efforts in areas such as trade, anti-money-laundering, research and innovation and economic and monetary policy. That is why we will continue engaging with Türkiye. Leaders reiterated [in the European Council] in April this year the interest of the European Union in developing a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye, strategically, politically and economically. It is what they said in April, and following these April 2024 conclusions, we have tried to re-engage our relationships with Türkiye and concrete steps were taken towards a constructive exchange on issues of joint interest. That is what we will continue to try to do, hoping that Türkiye will be actively supporting the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement on the Cyprus issue, within the United Nations’ framework – something that cannot be solved without Türkiye’s participation. That is [a more than enough] reason to continue engaging with Türkiye in spite as you said of this low rate of alignment with our foreign policy.
Q. I have a question for the High Representative. Before that, I will quote a part of the Report on Serbia. It says: “It still does not align with any restrictive measures against the Russian Federation and does not align with most of the High Representative’s statement on this matter. It has maintained high level relations with the Russian Federation and intensified its relations with China, raising questions about Serbia’s strategic direction.” Can you please help me understand how come that, regarding this sentence, the Commission is still asking Members Countries to continue the talks with Serbia, and open further negotiation chapters. For me it is hard to understand what is happening.
Second, what stage from today until the Russian aggression ended against Ukraine, the EU has to take a decision what to do with Serbia’s next steps.
Serbia has applied for and is negotiating membership of the European Union. It is negotiating. [This is the] first step. Second step: Serbia’s decision implied that the country aligns with the European Union, including on foreign policy. This also includes restrictive measures, which is an important part of our foreign policy. We want to count on Serbia: as a partner with common principles, values, security prosperity and we need Serbia to reassure us on its strategic direction. We have been crystal clear with our partners – including with Serbia – that relations with Russia cannot be business as usual with Putin’s regime in the shadow of Russia’s attack against Ukraine. The deepening of Serbia’s relationship with China is also a strategic concern in the current geopolitical context. There are different approaches among Members of the European Union on their relationship with China. There are differences, certainly, but it is important for us that the newcomers, the ones who will become members of the European Union, understand which are our strategic concerns in the current geopolitical context. Serbia is maybe the most important political, economic partner [in the region] – and also, we are the biggest donor to Serbia. The European perspective for Serbia is the only sustainable way to build long-term prosperity and resilience. So, we have to work in order to change the pace of this foreign policy alignment. We insist on that and we explained [it] to Serbia. I think that Serbia, sooner or later, will have to align their foreign policy with the European Union’s foreign policy. Otherwise, [the] membership will be jeopardised. But we are still in a process.
Q. What was your assessment of the stage of the fundamental freedoms and values in Ukraine if you consider that the country is still in a war and in the conditions on martial law?
The question is more or less: “is the enlargement process suitable for a country at war?” Well, Ukraine has not chosen this position. Ukraine has not chosen to be at war. Ukraine is at war because it has been aggressed. Ukraine has become a candidate at a very rapid pace, very quickly, precisely because it is at war. We need to show that we support Ukraine, not only militarily but also politically. We understand that a country at war is a country at war. It is very difficult to do the reforms needed while you are being bombed, while your people are being killed, when you have to send your men and women to the battlefield, when your electricity system has been destroyed, when [your] whole life is being disturbed. But that does not prevent the respect of fundamental rights. On the contrary, I think that is a moment to continue fighting against corruption and the current government is doing [it]. It is the moment to continue developing this judicial reform, and the government is doing [it]. It is the moment to reinforce the rule of law because this is part of the way to become member of the European Union.
Q. On dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, since obviously maybe this is the last time you will have a chance to talk about the issue. You mentioned many highlights of the process but you can also agree there were many setbacks, including some, as you called, uncoordinated actions in the North, and including an attack that you, yourself, qualified as terrorist attack in Banjska last year. Do you bear part of responsibility for the lack of implementation of agreements on the way how you handled as facilitator of a process? And looking back at Ohrid, would you have managed it differently and pressure parties to sign this agreement in order to remove any obstacle on its way – at least political obstacle – on its way towards implementation?
Certainly, everything could have been done otherwise. Everything can be done in a different manner. But I think we did that on the way that both parties could accept. I think that everybody has to understand that this process is not about recognition. Recognition, if [it] comes, [it] will come at the end. It is about normalisation, which is a much more modest process. Objective. You cannot start acting as if you were recognised by the other side, because this is not the case. You cannot confuse your wishes with reality. I think that we have been putting it clearly, at every moment, that things have to go step by step. Understanding the concerns and the constitutional limits of both parties. Then things went badly at a certain moment. They were derailing with these tragic events that cost the life of many people and put the process on the edge of the abysm. Then, there were measures and just let me explain you that I presented a report on the fulfilment by Kosovo of the European Union request to Member States in June, and I recommended the lifting of these measures. This has been my assessment and recommendation. The decision, as always, is up to the Member States to be taken in the Council. Let’s see what the Member States decide finally, but my recommendation has been clear. I want to use this last opportunity to talk about it, to say that I expect Kosovo and Serbia to address and resolve open issues between them, in the framework of the European Union Facilitated Dialogue, and I thank Miroslav Lajčák and his team for all the work they have done during these years. Thank you.
Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-263314